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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of equity derivatives1 and related structured 
financial products, the North American conception of corporate govern-
ance faces a new and distinct challenge to its underlying premises. The 
shareholder-primacy model rests largely on the linkage between econom-
ic interest and legal rights. Yet, the introduction and rapid growth of eq-
uity swaps, contracts-for-difference, and equity monetization2 has meant 
that many significant equity investors have fully hedged their economic 
interest in the corporation, substantially altering relationships between 
corporate directors and their equity investors. Equity derivatives separate 
shareholder votes from economic interest3 and, in that respect, challenge 
the underlying premise of shareholder primacy, which is that default con-
trol rights and accountability of corporate officers should be directed to-
ward the equity investors who have the greatest economic stake in the 
corporation. 
This Article analyzes these developments with a focus on the impli-
cations for director and officer accountability and corporate sustainabil-
ity, using the occasion of the third symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. 
Center on Corporations, Law & Society to consider whether Berle’s 
analysis of corporate accountability offers any insights into how to ad-
dress the uncoupling of economic interest and legal rights in corporate 
governance. Part II of this Article sets the context for the discussion, dis-
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 1. Equity derivatives are generally over-the-counter structured financial products and include 
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tinguishing the model of corporate governance prevalent in the United 
States from models applied elsewhere. It also briefly discusses why 
Berle’s shareholder-accountability model resonated with governance 
challenges at the time Berle wrote. Part III examines how the introduc-
tion of equity swaps and similarly structured financial products has, in a 
number of instances, uncoupled legal rights and economic interests, fun-
damentally challenging some of the underlying rationales for the share-
holder-primacy model. Part IV discusses director and officer accounta-
bility in jurisdictions where equity swaps have become prevalent, and 
Part V considers directors hedging their own risk through derivatives 
activities. Part VI briefly examines why some of the current regulatory 
initiatives do not address the accountability concerns raised by deriva-
tives activities, and Part VII provides some initial thoughts as to how 
Berle’s original reasoning might be adapted to a more nuanced model of 
corporate governance and accountability. Part VIII concludes by noting 
that Berle’s analysis that the exercise of corporate power is subject to the 
equitable limitation that it cannot harm the interests of equity holders can 
potentially be applied to a broader set of stakeholders, and that the good 
faith conduct of directors and officers may play a role in determining 
what economic interest is actually at risk. 
II. OVERALL CONTEXT OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
The equity derivatives issues discussed below implicate only par-
ticular types of corporate-governance regimes, most specifically in the 
United States and, to a lesser degree, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
other countries that have adopted various iterations or forms of a share-
holder-primacy model. Globally, there are many types of corporate-
governance frameworks that link the management and oversight of cor-
porations to a variety of objectives. While most, but not all, companies 
share a wealth-maximizing objective, the fiduciary and other relation-
ships they have with their multiple stakeholders temper those objectives 
in a myriad of ways across jurisdictions. The behavior of directors and 
officers reflects cultural, social, and political norms. The United States’ 
model is generally less concerned with continuing relationships with em-
ployees, relationships of trust, and business dealings with commercial 
counterparties than the governance structures used in countries such as 
Japan and Korea.4 
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Companies protect and take greater account of the interests of em-
ployees, creditors, the community, the environment, and other stakehold-
ers in very different ways, and there are numerous multi-stakeholder 
models of corporate accountability across the globe. In jurisdictions such 
as India and Canada, pyramid capital structures mean that controlling 
shareholders’ influence over decision-making and the board selection 
process is disproportionate to their actual equity holdings.5 Yet, when the 
controlling group has familial or other close relationships, they are often 
also more committed to the long-term sustainability of the company, 
even if there is a potential conflict of interest regarding decisions that 
could extract value for their personal reward to the detriment of the com-
pany. Employee participation in governance is the norm under the gov-
ernance models used by some countries, such as the codetermination 
model in Germany or the employee-board-appointee model in Japan. In 
some instances, it is linked to shareholding; in others, it is not. Such cor-
porations are often operated in the best interests of a broad set of stake-
holders. 
The United States has historically had a much narrower conception 
of corporate accountability and governance. The structure of corporate 
accountability has operated on a more limited understanding of director 
and officer obligations; specifically, corporations are to be operated in 
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, often collapsing 
shareholder and corporate interest in what is referred to as the “share-
holder-primacy” model.6 
The approach was premised on the notion that shareholders have di-
rect economic interests at risk in the corporation. Hence, the traditional 
corporate law norm in the United States is that shareholders have a bun-
dle of rights that reflect their status as residual economic claimants of the 
corporation, including voting rights, as well as the right to have an ap-
praisal conducted or a disclosure made, receive any dividends declared, 
trade or sell shares, and bring personal or derivative claims for either 
personal harms or harms against the corporation.7 In Canada, sharehold-
ers also have the ability to bring oppression claims against the directors 
and officers for acting in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudi-
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cial, or that unfairly disregards the interests of shareholders.8 On wind-up 
of a financially solvent company, shareholders enjoy the right to a pro-
portional share of the company’s economic value. This bundle of rights 
was designed to reflect the residual economic interests of investors aris-
ing from their equity investment.9 The degree of economic interest in the 
company is traditionally viewed as commensurate with the number of 
shares held. Thus, the shareholder-primacy model suggests that share-
holders have the greatest incentive to hold managers accountable for 
their actions due to their interest in the corporation, and directors and 
officers are to make decisions in the best interests of shareholders. 
There has historically been greater incentive to explore different 
mechanisms through which to influence corporate governance for equity 
investors with significant holdings at risk, particularly where the inves-
tors are interested in long-term investment in the firm. Large institutional 
shareholders, such as pension funds, have directly engaged corporate 
boards in their governance practices and oversight, having determined 
that active engagement is in the best interests of the investors whose as-
sets they manage.10 They have often served as lead shareholders in proxy 
fights or lead plaintiffs in legal actions to hold the corporation and its 
officers accountable for particular decisions or conduct.11 Controlling 
and institutional shareholders have brought their own normative values 
and preferences for governance to their efforts to influence corporate 
behavior and hold directors and officers accountable.12 
A. Berle’s View of Corporate Accountability to Shareholders 
As Berle observed, corporate managers in the United States have 
historically had to run their affairs in the interests of their security hold-
ers.13 He argued that large-scale production has necessitated a high de-
gree of financial concentration that has clothed itself in the corporate 
form, and as a result, there are large entities, the task of whose admin-
istration is fundamentally that of industrial government.14 Berle was con-
cerned with the absolute control and power that would be acquired by 
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ernance and accountability that are beyond the scope of this Article. See SARRA, supra note 6. 
 13. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1365 (1932). 
 14. Id. at 1366. 
2013] Equity Derivatives  1121 
managers if the fiduciary obligation of corporate management and “con-
trol” owed to shareholders was weakened or eliminated.15 While he 
acknowledged the powerful impact of corporations on the lives of multi-
ple stakeholders, he was concerned that absent shareholder primacy, di-
rectors and officers would engage in self-interested conduct rather than 
act in the best interests of the corporation, and he believed that share-
holders were best-situated to hold officers accountable for their deci-
sions.16 
Berle argued that all powers granted to corporate managers were 
necessarily to be exercised in the best interests of shareholders at all 
times.17 His view was that the exercise of corporate power was subject to 
the equitable limit that it could not harm the interests of equity holders, 
even if the power had been exercised within the mandate of the direc-
tors.18 Thus, he argued, corporate powers must be tested twice: first to 
verify that corporate officers are acting within the authority granted to 
them, and then to verify that they are making decisions that benefit the 
shareholders.19 He observed that with power comes responsibility, and 
with the increasing range of powers and complexity of corporate activity, 
the overriding concern was to act in the best interests of shareholders.20 
As is well-known to corporate-governance scholars, Berle tested his 
thesis against particular powers, such as the duty not to issue new shares 
without protecting the rateable interest of existing and prospective share-
holders.21 He traced the jurisprudence with respect to noncash considera-
tion for shares and the courts’ assessment of the good faith actions of 
corporate officers, which he found to be a short-form expression for the 
obligation by directors and officers to protect shareholders’ equities by 
giving them the right to purchase any new shares in an amount that pro-
tected their proportional interest in the company.22 Thus, “preemptive” 
remedies arose from an attempt to impose an equitable limitation on the 
power of corporate officers to issue new stock.23 
Berle also analyzed the power to declare or withhold dividends in 
the best interests of the corporation as a whole and in a manner that bene-
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fits all its shareholders to the extent possible.24 The power must be exer-
cised in a manner that does not discriminate between shareholders in the 
same class, and discriminates between shareholders in different classes 
only when the corporate charter allows for such differential treatment.25 
Berle suggested that the power to acquire stock must be exercised in the 
best interests of the corporation as a whole and not to advance the enter-
prises of the directors and officers.26 Hence, the takeover of another 
company must be justified in terms of the benefits to the corporation, a 
limitation imposed by the courts on the power that corporate officers 
hold.27 Similarly, rights to effect a merger are subject to a requirement 
that the respective interests of shareholders in all classes are respectively 
recognized and substantially protected.28 
Finally, the power by the majority of shareholders to amend the 
corporate charter, which in Berle’s view was to be exercised in a manner 
that benefited the corporation as a whole, equitably distributed any bene-
fit or sacrifice between all shareholding groups in the corporation “as 
their interests may appear.”29 Rights of the minority were not to be con-
fiscated or unreasonably oppressed. Berle observed that the courts uni-
formly reason that both the governing statute and the equities must be 
examined in making such determinations.30 
B. Developments in the Years since Berle 
In the years since Berle’s observations, the nature of shareholding 
has shifted, as has the capital structure of corporations. In addition to 
pension funds, influential shareholders now include hedge funds, private 
equity funds, and other significant wealth-equity investors who bring 
different norms to their relationship with the corporation, including fre-
quent preferences for short-term investment. Many are highly active in 
hedging their equity investments through derivatives products. The in-
centive effects of equity swaps and related products can exacerbate the 
already short-term interest that some of these investors have in a corpora-
tion.31 
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These developments are not confined to the United States.32 As 
multinational enterprises (MNE) grow in number and size, the structure 
of corporate governance has necessarily evolved. Often, corporations 
incorporate separate entities in the local jurisdictions in which they oper-
ate, ostensibly with separate corporate structures, directors, and officers, 
but frequently with the parent or holding company as the sole or control-
ling shareholder. Decision-making in those entities has increased in 
complexity; the degree of control over subsidiaries ranges across a broad 
spectrum, creating new challenges for director and officer accountabil-
ity.33 Even when subsidiaries are publicly traded in regional or interna-
tional markets, directors and officers working in subsidiaries in the host 
nations have often been heavily influenced by parent-company choices. 
Parent corporations influence governance through the transfer of norms 
and practices, including notions of accountability, responsibility, and 
sustainability.34 
Just as MNE have proliferated, hedge funds and other large inves-
tors have become international in the scope and complexity of their in-
vestments, holding interests in multiple jurisdictions. Host countries and 
their regulators must deal with foreign investors who are beyond easy 
reach of their domestic corporate and securities laws. Widespread foreign 
investment has implications for host countries; as such investors often 
use their influence on parent companies in the home jurisdiction to lobby 
for particular norms or practices, such as uploading profits earned in the 
subsidiary on a daily or weekly basis to the parent corporation, leaving 
insufficient assets in the host-country entity.35 Their commitment to sus-
tainability36 and protection of domestic stakeholders and communities 
may be fleeting or nonexistent given the pressure for high short-term re-
turns on their principals. Equity investment can be highly dynamic, such 
that share ownership is changing rapidly, reducing incentives to monitor 
corporate officers. 
Even with the increase in advocacy for corporate social responsibil-
ity, corporate sustainability, triple bottom-line accounting, and other 
mechanisms that recognize that corporations’ position within society 
provides them with a powerful influence over multiple aspects of the en-
vironmental, social, and economic lives of individuals, the shareholder-
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 35. Sarra, supra note 3, at 582. 
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primacy norm has maintained its dominance in both North American 
case law and board rooms.37 While this notion has been tempered slightly 
through corporate constituency statutes in the United States (which do 
not have effective remedies) and appellate case law in Canada,38 con-
cerns about director and officer accountability have firmly entrenched 
the notion that corporate interests can often, if not largely, be measured 
on a quarter-by-quarter basis through each corporation’s success in de-
livering financial returns to equity investors. 
Both in the United States and elsewhere, corporations and institu-
tional shareholders who are interested in the development of effective 
corporate-governance norms have concluded that numerous factors in-
fluence effective oversight, including independent decision-making, fi-
nancial-literacy skills, relationships with internal and external stakehold-
ers, and other indicia of effective governance.39 Most of those indicia can 
be measured against the benchmark of shareholder interest or broader 
stakeholder interest. There rests a normative question of whether, in real-
ity, directors and officers in their governance decisions consider only the 
interests of shareholders, and not the more complex interests and consid-
erations relating to markets, creditors, employees, and communities with 
which the corporation is involved. Even advocates of the simplistic man-
ager-shareholder, economic agent-principal dichotomy face significant 
challenges to their underlying assumptions with the introduction and pro-
liferation of equity derivatives. 
III. ENTER EQUITY DERIVATIVES 
The development of equity derivatives is a significant change to the 
nature of economic interest held by shareholders of a corporation. In 
some respects or situations, it can fundamentally challenge the underly-
ing premises of the shareholder-primacy approach to corporate accounta-
bility. 
Equity derivatives are generally over-the-counter (OTC) structured 
financial products, and include equity swaps, options, and futures. An 
investor can purchase equity derivatives to manage the economic risk of 
purchasing traditional shares. Equity derivatives and credit derivatives, 
the latter of which are not discussed in this Article, have experienced an 
                                                 
 37. Sarra, supra note 3, at 599–602. 
 38. Peoples Dep’t Store Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise [2004], 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.). For a discussion 
of the case, see generally JANIS SARRA & RONALD DAVIS, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY IN 
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (2d ed. 2010). 
 39. Janis Sarra, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Global Economy: Canadian Domestic 
Law and Legal Processes as a Vehicle for Creating and Enforcing International Norms (Canadian 
Inst. for the Admin. of Justice, Participatory Justice in a Global Economy: The New Rule of Law 
Conference Paper No. 668) (2004); Sarra & Kung, supra note 34, at 917. 
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exponential growth in recent years;40 the products are opaque, complex, 
and continually developing. Canadian regulators also use the term “equi-
ty monetization” to refer to a variety of sophisticated derivative-based 
strategies that permit investors to dispose of equity risk without transfer-
ring ownership.41 In some cases, the products are essentially the same, 
with different terminology used to describe them. In other instances, the 
products hold different bundles of economic and legal rights.42 The actu-
al economic interest held in such products as a hedge against the perfor-
mance of a corporation is difficult to quantify at any given moment.43 
What Canada and the United States refer to as equity derivatives are 
called contracts-for-difference (CFD) in the United Kingdom.44 CFD are 
derivative products that allow investors to speculate or hedge on the un-
derlying security movements. They are used by both shareholders and 
other investors with no direct shareholdings, as there is no need for own-
ership of the underlying security.45 CFD are generally traded over-the-
counter and mirror the economic performance of the underlying security 
based on its price movement. CFD offer all the benefits of trading shares 
without having to physically own them, and they are in essence an 
agreement between the buyer and seller to exchange the difference in the 
                                                 
 40. For a discussion of credit derivatives, see Elizabeth Murphy, Janis Sarra & Michael Creber, 
Credit Derivatives in Canadian Insolvency Proceedings, “The Devil will be in the Details,” in 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 187 (2006). 
 41. Staff Notice, Ontario Sec. Comm’n, Offerings of Contracts for Difference and Foreign 
Exchange Contracts to Investors in Ontario, Staff Notice No. 91-702 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
Staff Notice, Ontario Sec. Comm’n], available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities 
-Category9/sn_20091030_91-702_cdf.pdf. 
 42. Id.; see also CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS, CONSULTATION PAPER 91-401 ON OVER-THE-
COUNTER DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN CANADA (2010) [hereinafter CSA], available at http:// 
www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category9/csa_20101102_91-401_cp-on-derivatives.p 
df; ONTARIO SEC. COMM’N, REFORM OF OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) DERIVATIVES MARKETS IN 
CANADA: NOTICE AND DISCUSSION PAPER (2010), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/299 
10.htm. 
 43. CSA, supra note 42, at 14. The opacity of derivatives markets means that those parties 
hedging risk do not have information to assess the default risk of the counterparty or to appropriately 
price risk. Regulators do not have access to information that would assist in monitoring or address 
any build-up in systemic risk. 
 44. FIN. SERVS. AUTH. & HM TREASURY, REFORMING OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS, A UK 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2009) [hereinafter REFORMING OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS], available at http:// 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_derivatives.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPLEMENTING OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS (2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publica 
tions/r_101025.pdf; INV. DEALERS ASS’N OF CAN., REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTS FOR 
DIFFERENCE (CFDS) (2007) [hereinafter REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF CFDS], available at 
http://sdocs.iiroc.ca/English/Documents/2007/CF983987-B0A4-49C8-81DF-CF5EDC640E99_en.p 
df. 
 45. REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF CFDS, supra note 44. Contracts-for-difference (CFD) are 
typically a contract between the investor and the issuer. They have varying brand names depending 
on who issues them, such as Turbo Certificates, Waves, or in Hong Kong, Callable Bull/Bear Con-
tracts (CBBC). Id. at 4. 
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current value of a share and its value at the end of the contract.46 “If the 
difference is positive, the seller pays the buyer. If it is negative, the buyer 
is the one who loses money.”47 While prevalent in the United Kingdom, 
the first CFD were not approved in Canada until 2009, and only then in 
two provinces.48 Additionally, Canadian regulators have restricted such 
products to accredited investors only.49 
The widespread use of equity derivatives, particularly equity 
swaps—one of the most common forms of derivatives—poses significant 
questions for corporate governance. As noted above, the bundle of share-
holder rights assumes a direct link between the shareholder’s legal and 
economic interests. Yet, derivatives challenge that fundamental notion, 
as they uncouple economic and legal interest in specific circumstances. 
Equity swaps can be cash-settled or physically settled. For cash-settled 
equity swaps, the shareholder retains legal title to the shares and thus the 
bundle of shareholder rights but is paid out the cash value of the swap on 
the occurrence of certain events. For example, the swap will specify a 
particular triggering event like a default by the company on a payment to 
a creditor, a management change, or the loss of a particular contract. On 
the event occurring and settling of the swap, the shareholder continues to 
hold legal title in the shares and continues to vote those shares, even 
though it has no further economic risk, having recouped the original in-
vestment plus any current value assigned to payout of the swap. The 
shareholder can still reap any upside gains. Thus, the shareholder’s legal 
claim under its shares has become uncoupled from its economic risk. 
With no financial investment at risk, the shareholder may act in ways 
that appear contrary to what would normally be in its economic interest, 
such as to press for decisions about corporate direction or activity that 
would benefit competitor corporations in which it does have a direct fi-
nancial investment at risk. 
Moreover, shareholders can over-hedge their risk by purchasing 
swaps of greater value than the underlying shares on which the swaps are 
based, in effect creating a negative economic interest in the corporation if 
the trigger for payment is an adverse event with respect of the corpora-
                                                 
 46. Id. The reference asset can also be a currency, commodity, or index. 
 47. Contracts for Difference and CFD Trading, CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE, http://www.con 
tracts-for-difference.com/ (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 48. Staff Notice, Ontario Sec. Comm’n, supra note 41. 
 49. What are CFDs?, CMC MARKETS CANADA, http://www.cmcmarkets.ca/cfd/what-are (last 
visited May 22, 2012). CFD issuers must also establish cumulative-loss limits for each client’s ac-
count under Ontario and Québec securities law, including $1 million in financial wealth other than 
real estate or a salary of $200,000 over the past three years, and on condition that sellers disclose the 
risks of CFDs and evaluate client’s investment knowledge and trading experience. Issuers of CFDs 
must be registered as investment dealers and regulated by the Investment Industry Regulatory Or-
ganization of Canada (IIROC). 
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tion. For example, Shareholder A may have an estimated one million 
USD value in shares in Corporation B and equity swaps valued at two 
million. In such circumstances, it may be in the shareholder’s interest to 
assist in precipitating a triggering event because the cash payout on its 
shares is double the value of the shares in the market. If the triggering 
event would have an adverse economic impact on the corporation, it 
would appear to an observer that the shareholder was acting contrary to 
its interests by depressing the value of its shares. 
In a takeover situation or other fundamental transaction for which 
shareholders are given a vote, the equity-swap-holding shareholder may 
hold a significant percentage of the votes as registered owner but may 
have no economic interest at risk, as it has fully hedged its risk through 
the purchase of equity swaps. In the case of a fully or over-covered equi-
ty swap, these shareholders do not have to disclose the lack of any eco-
nomic interest or risk in most jurisdictions. Directors and officers do not 
necessarily know whether it is the registered shareholder or the equity-
swap seller who holds the economic interest in the company;50 and yet, 
under the shareholder-primacy model, their governance decisions may be 
highly influenced by these shareholders. 
Equity swaps can also be physically settled, rather than cash-
settled, although such settlement mechanisms are on the decline.51 Physi-
cally settled equity swaps are less problematic for corporate accountabil-
ity concerns. On the occurrence of a specified event, the swap pay-out 
conditions are triggered and the ownership and voting rights of the shares 
are traded for cash in the settlement of the equity swap. In such cases, the 
new shareholder has acquired the economic interest in the corporation, 
and as with all shareholders, it is required to disclose its shareholdings 
when the concentration reaches a specified amount.52 The corporation 
has new shareholders that it is accountable to, but the shareholders are 
now known to corporate officers or other investors. But even here, there 
can be some issues with respect to an investor holding a sizeable number 
of swaps, and then at settlement, the corporation finds it has a very sig-
nificant new shareholder, say with 10 to 20% or more of holdings, that 
the directors and officers were unaware of until settlement of the swap.53 
Securities or financial services legislation in many jurisdictions requires 
disclosure of incremental changes in equity ownership through the 
                                                 
 50. SARRA, supra note 31; Henry Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Emp-
ty Voting II: Important Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 642, 708–09 (2008); Murphy, Sarra & 
Creber, supra note 40. 
 51. SARRA, supra note 31, at 8. 
 52. Id. at 7. 
 53. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 646–48. 
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threshold disclosure requirements;54 but the transparency sought by such 
requirements is negated by this increasingly common practice. 
Cash-settled equity swaps create a lack of transparency because the 
investor who holds the economic benefit of the shares but not the voting 
rights is frequently unknown. An investor can unwind an equity swap as 
per a prior agreement with the dealer and acquire voting rights, or it can, 
in some cases, instruct the dealer how to vote the shares.55 When there 
are formal rights to unwind a swap or to direct the dealer to vote a par-
ticular way, the shareholder will likely come within the disclosure re-
quirements of securities or financial services law if the shareholdings 
meet the legislative threshold.56 But when the voting rights are not legal-
ly enforceable and relational-based or implicit, there is often no require-
ment for disclosure.57 
Equity swaps are primarily a North American phenomenon used to 
hedge or speculate on equity investment and are used to a lesser degree 
in the United Kingdom for that purpose. Internationally, equity deriva-
tives are also commonly used to hedge currencies or other commodi-
ties.58 Equity swaps are not considered securities in many jurisdictions, 
and are frequently not subject to disclosure and investor-protection pro-
visions unless they fall within materiality requirements in issuer-
disclosure obligations or management-disclosure requirements.59 Alter-
natively, they are considered securities but are part of the exempt market, 
the assumption being that they are traded only among very sophisticated 
parties and are thus not of regulatory concern. Even if one accepts that 
they are not the concern of regulatory oversight, they still have implica-
tions for corporate governance and accountability. 
In addition to the incentive effects created by hedge funds and simi-
lar investors over-hedging risk of their investments, parent corporations 
are also engaged in the equity swaps market to hedge risks associated 
with their wholly-owned subsidiaries or other companies in which they 
are directly invested. Through equity swaps, the parent corporation is 
controlling some of its economic risk, but such products can create new 
incentives to govern or influence particular subsidiaries in the short- or 
                                                 
 54. For example, in Switzerland, the amount is 3%. Regulation, SWISS FED. BANKING 
COMM’N, http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/e/regulier/index.html (last accessed May 22, 2012). 
 55. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 648. 
 56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
 57. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 655. 
 58. Currency swaps, much more prevalent internationally, involve a much larger discussion 
that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 59. Directors and insiders must, however, disclose all of their swaps. See infra Part V. 
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long-term interests of the parent, rather than of the subsidiaries, notwith-
standing that they are separate legal entities.60 
The degree of this hedging is arguably influenced by the economic 
and social culture of the parent company. For example, in jurisdictions 
with strong blockholding corporate ownership structures, banks and oth-
er financial institutional shareholders integrated their derivatives activi-
ties on both the equity and debt side of the investment, yet their activities 
in this respect have been tempered by their jurisdiction’s corporate 
norms, in terms of using such derivatives to protect or defend particular 
stakeholder interests. In family-owned or dominated corporations, equity 
derivatives might be less frequently used because the governance struc-
ture may have different sensitivities toward long-term economic sustain-
ability and employee protection. Contractual relations might be influ-
enced by a more nuanced understanding of fiduciary and statutory obli-
gations to stakeholders, and thus, the incentive to over-hedge risk re-
duced. Therefore, governance risks from derivative activity are influ-
enced by both the corporation’s capital structure and the degree to which 
hedging by shareholders through equity swaps skews the behavior of 
shareholders actually able to influence corporate decision-makers.61 
A variety of other strategies currently uncouple legal and economic 
interest in equity investment. Hu and Black observed that such uncou-
pling practices have become prevalent on a low-cost and large-scale ba-
sis in the United States. For example, the market for share lending in-
cludes 20% or more of all the outstanding shares of most large United 
States corporations.62 Hu and Black suggested that this “soft parking” of 
shares means that shares are held in friendly hands that have voting 
rights but no economic ownership and that provide access to shareholder 
rights when desired under an informal arrangement to either vote as di-
rected or unwind the shares back to the hidden owner.63 The parties hold-
ing these kinds of shares are often derivatives dealers or banks, allowing 
the hidden owner to avoid disclosure of its interest in the corporation, as 
well as other regulatory requirements such as mandatory bid rules.64 The 
                                                 
 60. Sarra, supra note 3, at 601. 
 61. CSA, supra note 42, at 15. AIG’s financial distress and subsequent bailout in September 
2008 was an instance where counterparty risk in credit-default swaps transformed into systemic risk. 
The lack of transparency in derivatives markets contributes to systemic risk because market partici-
pants cannot accurately measure their counterparties’ exposures, and regulators cannot identify areas 
of concentrated risk or systemically important entities before it is too late to prevent a shock in the 
capital markets. 
 62. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 701. 
 63. Id. at 639. 
 64. Id. at 639. Hu and Black also discussed “record date capture,” in which the investor bor-
rows the shares in the stock loan market just before the record date and then returns the shares after-
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Hedge Fund Working Group in the United Kingdom has recommended a 
ban on the use of borrowed shares for empty-voting purposes.65 
Why are these trends a problem? The assumption that voting power 
reflects economic interest at risk is no longer valid. Shareholders with 
significant shareholdings are in a position to influence the decisions of 
directors and officers because of their voting power, even though they 
may have no economic risk in the outcome of those decisions. When 
formal votes are required, such as in respect to fundamental changes, this 
disconnection may skew voting results because the votes will not truly 
represent the wishes of investors whose interests are allied with the cor-
poration’s fortunes. 
As equally important as formal voting power, significant share-
holders are in a position to informally influence directors and officers 
through meetings, media statements, and policy positions. When those 
shareholders have little or no economic interest, this influence may yield 
results that are not in the best interests of shareholders or the corporation. 
When a shareholder has fully hedged its interest in the company and has 
an economic interest in a competitor company, the shareholder may ac-
tively press for a decision that advances its economic interests in that 
competitor entity. Directors and officers who seek to engage in dynamic 
and responsive governance practices may find it difficult to discern 
which investors truly have an economic interest in the corporation. 
Potential takeovers create additional issues. The laws in many ju-
risdictions currently require disclosure of holdings above specified 
thresholds so that corporate stakeholders are alerted to the fact that a 
company is “in play.” In Canada, that threshold is 10% of the target’s 
voting stock; in the United States, the threshold is 5%.66 Such pre-bid 
notifications alert other shareholders to the potential for a takeover bid 
and may lead to an increase in the market price of the target company’s 
shares. But equity derivatives that allow for conversion into shares per-
mit an investor to collect shares without technically meeting disclosure 
requirements of securities laws in a number of jurisdictions.67 
In 2008, Hu and Black documented more than eighty cases of using 
equity derivatives to skew corporate behavior in this manner.68 One ex-
ample was the case of Sulzer, a major Swiss engineering firm subject to a 
secret amassing of shares through use of equity derivatives. Swiss rules 
                                                                                                             
ward. In such a case, the investor has no economic interest at risk but has acquired the voting rights 
for the purpose of the particular meeting or transaction for which the record date was set. Id. at 641. 
 65. U.K. HEDGE FUND WORKING GRP, FINAL REPORT (2008), http://hfwg.webalistic.co.uk/?sec 
tion=10352. 
 66. Sarra, supra note 3, at 468. 
 67. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 639–42. 
 68. Id. 
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at that time required disclosure of share holdings of 5% or more, captur-
ing physically settled call options but not cash-settled equity derivatives. 
An Austro-Russian group was able to amass a 32% stake in the company 
through cash-settled call options provided by two banks, at least one of 
which had Sulzer as a client.69 When the group had a sufficient stake to 
make a bid to acquire the company, it unwound its swaps and obtained 
the dealers’ matched shares.70 
Thus, equity swaps are being used to bypass securities law re-
quirements. When an investor is ready to make a bid for the company, 
the investor exercises the options, acquires the percentage of shares it 
wishes to use to make the takeover bid, and then is required to disclose. 
There can be considerable amassing of shares before corporate officers 
or other investors are aware that there is a new significant shareholder. 
These practices are also prevalent in Canada and the United States, alt-
hough given the failure of securities regulators to require full disclosure, 
the extent of the practices are unknown.71 
IV. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY IN AN 
EQUITY SWAPS WORLD 
The uncoupling of shareholder and corporate economic interest that 
occurs through equity directives can create new agency issues with re-
spect to decision-making by directors and officers. The rapid settlement 
of swaps in successive waves and with minimal transparency can mean 
that directors and officers have little sense of where the true economic 
investment in their business lies. As they become more aware of the dis-
connect between legal voting rights and the economic interests at risk, it 
may affect their incentives to act in the best interests of the corporation 
or its shareholders, as the likelihood of being held accountable may di-
minish. Such an outcome is precisely what Berle sought to avoid by ad-
vocating that accountability of directors and officers be exclusively in the 
hands of shareholders. 
Equity swaps have thus created in some instances a misalignment 
between the shareholders’ and corporation’s interests. A shareholder can 
invest and then purchase a swap to hedge its risk. For smaller investors, 
this strategy does not really have an impact on corporate governance, as 
the amount of holdings hedged does not affect control rights. But for 
hedge funds and other larger institutional investors, the disconnect be-
                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See CAROL HANSELL ET AL., DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG LLP, THE QUALITY OF 
THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE IN CANADA, (2010), available at http://www.dwpv.com/Sites/shareholder 
voting/media/The-Quality-of-the-Shareholder-Vote-in-Canada.pdf. 
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tween legal ownership of the shares and economic risk creates disincen-
tives for the shareholders to monitor the activities of directors and offic-
ers. It also arguably creates negative externalities, in that small share-
holders who could previously rely on the monitoring and governance role 
of institutional shareholders will not be aware that their incentives to 
monitor have been reduced. The previous signaling by institutional 
shareholders, either from their proxy activities, media statements, or 
shifting of significant investment, may no longer be reliable and may 
remove an important part of the synergistic aspects of investor oversight 
of the activities of directors and officers.72 
Executive compensation practices have also influenced these 
trends. For corporations involved in the business of swaps,73 in addition 
to their other commercial activities, such as insurance or financial ser-
vices, the high short-term earnings in the swaps market created incen-
tives for managers not to consider the liquidity risk if there was a mass 
call to settle swaps, and the swaps activities may place the entire corpo-
rate group at risk. 
V. DIRECTORS HEDGING THEIR OWN RISK HAS 
GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS 
A frequent practice to help ensure effective corporate governance 
during the past several decades has been to align the interests of direc-
tors, officers, and shareholders by structuring compensation packages to 
provide appropriate incentives. In recent years, the effort has been to in-
clude long-term equity investments in the corporation, shifting share op-
tions, warrants, and issuance practices to ensure that corporate officers 
are not incentivized to act only in a manner that increases the immediate 
or short-term price of the shares. Requirements to hold shares for a peri-
od of time before selling and other similar initiatives are viewed as 
mechanisms to align manager and shareholder interest. The growing 
practice of directors and officers hedging their equity investments in their 
own corporations undermines the ability of such compensation practices 
to truly align interests. 
Such hedging must be disclosed to investors under most corporate 
law statutes in North America;74 however, there may be an issue with 
respect to the quality of the disclosure as to both its content and transpar-
ency within the financial disclosure documents. Moreover, it assumes 
that both internal and external audit functions are monitoring and correct-
ing the quality of such disclosures and, where necessary, linking the 
                                                 
 72. SARRA, supra note 31, at 468. 
 73. For example, corporations like Lehman Brothers or AIG. 
 74. See, e.g., Staff Notice, Ontario Sec. Comm’n, supra note 41, at 15. 
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quantum of hedging with an assessment of the performance of the direc-
tors and officers. 
Hence, the purchase of equity swaps and similar products by direc-
tors raises director accountability issues. Directors and insiders of public-
ly traded companies must disclose all of their swaps, but investors may 
not appreciate the incentive effects of directors hedging their own equity 
investment in the company. Corporate officers may use equity-derivative 
strategies to defeat changes in control by facilitating the ability of insid-
ers or friendly third parties to vote shares with little or no economic ex-
posure. Officers create the incentives for the voting shareholder to vote 
pursuant to the officers’ interests, but do not directly have that control, as 
it would run afoul of corporate and securities laws in a number of juris-
dictions.75 Moreover, employees participating in stock-purchase pro-
grams or investing their pension benefits in the economic fortunes of the 
company may not understand that directors are hedging their own per-
sonal risk through equity swaps because even if disclosed, employees do 
not often read company financial statements. The shareholder-primacy 
norm already leads to a discounting of the value of employee labor and 
other inputs, even though employees are important stakeholders in the 
overall sustainability of the corporation. This discounting may be height-
ened when directors have hedged their own risk through equity swaps, in 
the sense of incentives to make decisions about the company. 
If equity swaps in their current iteration are a barrier to holding di-
rectors and officers accountable, then to what extent should equity swaps 
be regulated or left to a self-regulatory regime? Hu and Black argued for 
shareholder attestation requirements, which would require large share-
holders to file federal ownership-disclosure reports attesting that voted 
shares do not exceed economically owned shares by a specified amount 
or threshold.76 They suggested that corporate law should be amended to 
allow firms to adopt provisions in their corporate charters to limit empty 
voting.77 Arguably, the shareholder with a negative interest may be vot-
ing against the interests of general shareholders in order to trigger the 
settlement of swaps or for other reasons, given that it has no investment 
at risk. 
Yet, any regulatory intervention will need to grapple with the more 
fundamental notion that shareholders can vote as they choose and corpo-
                                                 
 75. Hu & Black, supra note 50, at 702. Even when derivatives arrangements have not been 
made, these friendly relationships, such as between officers and pension-fund investment managers, 
can skew voting in favor of management. See generally RONALD B. DAVIS, DEMOCRATIZING 
PENSION FUNDS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2008). 
 76. Hu & Black, supra note 50. 
 77. Id. 
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rate law does not intervene to require disclosure either of their reasons 
for voting a particular way or to temper such behavior, aligning any poli-
cy decisions with the historical reasons for such nonintervention. 
VI. CURRENT REGULATORY EFFORTS DO NOT ADDRESS THESE 
ACCOUNTABILITY INCENTIVES 
Regulators across the world have determined that derivatives are 
important to the global economy, as they facilitate the transfer and miti-
gation of risks that could otherwise limit the ability of manufacturing 
companies to enter into long-term contracts or to contract in different 
currencies.78 There has been some initial regulatory intervention to make 
swap holdings more transparent, such as the United Kingdom Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) changing its disclosure requirements to include 
cash-settled derivatives in its takeover regulation, requiring disclosure of 
economic ownership of 1% or more in a target company, including cash-
settled CFD.79 That increased transparency may reduce the incidence of 
self-dealing transactions, but it does not necessarily address corporate 
accountability issues, as discussed in this Part. Regulators in the G20 
countries have also concluded that speculative derivatives activity is nec-
essary, as such counterparties serve as the liquidity providers willing to 
accept the risks.80 They also now realize that the risks that market partic-
ipants wish to hedge can be isolated to the counterparties or can create 
systemic risks.81 
A. Regulation of Equity Swaps in the United States 
There are many regulatory issues to be debated, such as transparen-
cy, counterparty risk, central counterparty clearing facilities (CCP), crea-
tion of trade-repository creation, capital and collateral adequacy, and an-
ti-abuse practices in the OTC market. All of these issues are important 
but beyond the scope of this short Article.82 One question of direct rele-
                                                 
 78. CSA, supra note 42, at 7. 
 79. REFORMING OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS, supra note 44; THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS & 
MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (2006), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf; Insider Reporting for Certain Derivative Transactions (Equity 
Monetization), CSA Multilateral Instrument 55–103 (Can. 2003). 
 80. CSA, supra note 42, at 7. 
 81. Id. at 10. 
 82. For example, in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes new capital requirements 
on swap dealers, which are defined as persons who (i) hold themselves out as dealers in swaps; (ii) 
make a market in swaps; (iii) regularly enter into swaps with counterparties in the ordinary course of 
the business for their own account, or (iv) engage in other activities that would cause it to be known 
as a dealer or market maker in swaps. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49) (2008). It also imposes such requirements 
on major swap participants, which are defined as persons that are not swap dealers but who hold 
substantial positions that create counterparty exposure to the point that they could have a serious 
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vance, however, is whether the current regulatory measures address the 
governance incentive effects discussed above. The United States Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act) mandates the clearing of many swap and security-based swap trans-
actions by a clearinghouse.83 A “swap” is defined by the Dodd-Frank Act 
to include a broad range of contracts, including equity swaps.84 The defi-
nition of “security-based swap” in the Dodd-Frank Act includes any 
transaction based on a narrow-based security index, single security, or 
loan.85 The Dodd-Frank Act allows a swap to be exempted from the 
mandatory clearing requirement if one of the two counterparties (1) is 
not a financial entity; (2) is using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial 
risk; and (3) notifies the SEC or CFTC how it generally meets its finan-
cial obligations associated with entering into noncleared swaps.86 Such 
risk-management strategies make sense to a degree, as hedging direct 
commercial risk does not create a systemic risk in and of itself,87 but they 
                                                                                                             
impact on financial markets. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)(A). The Dodd-Frank Act establishes margin require-
ments on uncleared swaps applicable to nonbank entities. As the result of concerns that the margin 
requirements may cause swap dealers to increase the prices of swap instruments or require clients to 
post margin, the drafters of the Act clarified that it was not intended to impose additional costs on 
end-users and urged regulators to consider the impact on end-users when determining margin re-
quirements. CSA, supra note 42, at 41–42. 
Québec Derivatives Act, R.S.Q., c. C-1, s. 14.01 (Can.) gives the AMF jurisdiction over all deriv-
atives contracts, with a clear definition of a derivative and a regime separate from securities over-
sight. The Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), and the Commodity Futures Act, 
C R.S.O. 1990, c. C.20 (Can.), share jurisdiction. The Canadian OTC Derivatives Working Group 
(OTCDWG), formed in December 2009, provides advice and coordinates efforts to meet Canada’s 
G20 commitments related to OTC derivatives in a manner consistent with the continuing stability of 
the Canadian financial system. CSA, supra note 42, at 9; see also FED. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 44. 
 83. Much of the detail will be developed through rulemaking by the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
 84. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 721(a)(47), 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1a(47) (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. A “swap” is defined in the Dodd-Frank Act to include 
a broad range of contracts, agreements, and transactions, including options that are based on other 
rates, currency commodities, securities, debt instruments, indices, quantitative measures, and other 
financial and economic interests. Id. Swaps also include transactions that provide for a purchase, 
sale, payment, or delivery that is dependent on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a contingency 
associated with financial consequences; transactions that provide for payments based on interest or 
other rates; and transactions that are commonly known in the trade as swaps or swap agreements. Id. 
 85. Dodd-Frank Act § 761, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(42). 
 86. See Dodd-Frank Act § 723, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A). The Dodd-Frank Act gives a nonfinan-
cial end-user the choice as to whether to clear or not, and where to clear the trade. Id. § 2(h)(7)(B). 
The CFTC and SEC must review on an ongoing basis all swap contracts to determine if a swap or 
category of swap contract should be required to be cleared. Clearinghouses must submit any swap it 
plans on accepting to the CFTC or SEC for clearing, and the regulator then determines if the swap 
should be required to be cleared. 
 87. The CSA is currently considering whether the requirement for clearing and collateral 
should apply if the derivative contract is not unique or is essentially equivalent to a standardized 
contract, and whether the availability of an exemption should depend on the counterparty to the 
derivatives transaction or the volume of derivative transactions. Press Release, Can. Sec. Adm’rs, 
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generally fail to account for the incentive effects on the directors and 
officers created by such exemptions. 
Corporations, significant and institutional investors, directors, and 
officers using equity swaps are exempted from many provisions, as they 
do not fall within the definition of a financial entity. Moreover, there is a 
lack of clarity on how “hedging of commercial risk” is defined, as well 
as how it will be disclosed, measured, or monitored for those entities that 
are swept under the provisions. The measures do not address the uncou-
pling of economic interests and legal rights. Thus, the very incentive ef-
fects that negate the force of the shareholder-primacy argument have not 
been addressed. 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that registered swap dealers and ma-
jor swap participants conform to business conduct standards prescribed 
by the CFTC and SEC relating to fraud, supervision, and adherence to 
position limits.88 Among other measures, disclosure of material conflicts 
of interest will be required, which could in some small measure serve to 
temper the negative externalities associated with corporate officers or 
significant shareholders over-hedging risk through swaps. 
Arguably, though, other transparency requirements are necessary. 
Until we can better see how equity swaps and other derivatives transac-
tions may be skewing director and officer accountability mechanisms, it 
is difficult to conceptualize either a governance model or regulatory 
strategy to remedy the most egregious problems. 
B. Swaps North of the Border 
Canadian regulators have concluded that most companies that par-
ticipate in the OTC derivatives market do so to hedge their risk—to miti-
gate or offset the financial risks that arise from their activities. But stand-
ardized OTC derivative products may be harmful to such risk mitiga-
tion.89 In Canada, as in the United States, regulators are concluding that 
                                                                                                             
The CSA Seeks Comments on the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Surveillance and 
Enforcement (Nov. 25, 2011), available at http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id 
=997&terms=derivatives. 
 88. The requirements specifically include the following: reporting and recordkeeping, includ-
ing maintenance of daily trading records and a complete audit trail; verification of counterparty 
eligibility as an eligible contract participant; documentation and back office standards; disclosure to 
counterparties of contract characteristics, any material incentives and conflicts of interest; core prin-
ciples for compliance and designation of compliance officers; antitrust considerations; and disclo-
sure. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1). 
 89. CSA, supra note 42, at 24–25. The CSA has concluded that the use of OTC derivatives by 
these end-users is focused on transferring a risk arising from the end-user’s business to a third party, 
and is not intended to create a profit through speculation. And the OTC derivative is tailored to the 
business of the end-user and in some situations may not be considered to be a standardized OTC 
derivative for the purpose of applying various regulatory proposals. Id. at 46. 
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regulatory reform should not hinder such risk-offsetting activities, in-
cluding efforts by corporations to avoid volatility in their income state-
ments through hedge accounting.90 The result is a move to exempt indi-
vidual corporations from CCP clearing if the regulator concludes that 
central clearing is not appropriate, although these exemptions are cur-
rently in the process of being defined both in Canada and elsewhere.91 
Canadian securities regulators have concluded that an exemption 
should not be available to speculative transactions, which could limit the 
“over-hedging” that currently occurs.92 It anticipates fulsome reporting 
without exemptions for trades to a trade repository, which enables regu-
lators to monitor all market activity, including potential systemic risks 
and use of exemptions. Regulators will retain authority to remove a mar-
ket participant’s exemption in cases where it is in the public interest.93 
The regulatory reforms in the United States and Canada address the 
systemic problems with allowing the hedging of risk, but the exemptions 
used by corporations and shareholders mean that the incentive effects for 
corporate governance of equity swaps created by the uncoupling of legal 
rights and economic interest are not addressed. Hence, the question is 
whether Berle’s analysis can offer any insights. 
VII. USING BERLE’S IDEAS TO RECONCEPTUALIZE DIRECTOR AND 
OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 
When powers are granted to directors and officers to act in the in-
terests of the corporation as a whole, Berle argued that the tacit assump-
tion is that those powers are to be used only for the benefit of all, and not 
to favor one set of shareholders over another.94 Significantly, Berle ob-
served the following: 
                                                 
 90. Id. Canadian securities regulators observed in their market participants report: 
Hedge accounting seeks to reflect the results of effective hedging activities, in particular 
hedging using derivatives, by reporting the effects of the derivative and the risk being 
hedged in the same period. Hedge accounting “avoids much of the volatility that would 
arise if the derivative gains and losses were recognized in the income statement, as re-
quired by normal accounting principles.” 
Id. at 25 (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Id. at 26. 
 92. Id. at 48. 
 93. The exercise of public-interest jurisdiction by regulator would include situations when 
there is evidence of trading activity that is effectively equivalent to the nature and type of business 
conducted by regulated market participants, as well as situations that involve the trading of an OTC 
derivative that presents a significant risk to the market or that results in a material risk to an entity 
that is systemically important to the market or the overall economy. Id. at 48. 
 94. Berle, supra note 17, at 1073; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on “the view that 
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits 
for their stockholders” until such time as you are prepared to offer a 
clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to 
someone else.95 
Hence, his rejection of a stakeholder model of accountability was in part 
driven by the lack of clearly enforceable corporate officer responsibility 
mechanisms to replace direct shareholder economic interest. 
In Berle’s conception of corporate accountability, the link between 
the economic interest and legal rights held by shareholders was signifi-
cant.96 If directors or officers act in a manner contrary to shareholder in-
terests, then shareholders would have the incentive to hold them to ac-
count through exit from the corporation, exercise of voting power to re-
place managers, or exercise of legal claims for financial redress from 
harms caused by particular decisions.97 It is the coupling of economic 
interests and incentives to hold managers accountable that have been at 
the heart of the shareholder-primacy approach. 
A principal objective of corporate governance is to maximize the 
wealth-generating capacity of the corporation. The unifying notion is that 
directors have a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and thus to maximize enterprise value through the oversight 
of managerial activity in the effective use of corporate assets. Juxtaposed 
against these norms are statutory standards.98 In 2004, the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Peoples Department Stores v. Wise held that the “best in-
terests of the corporation” should not be read simply as the “best interests 
of shareholders” and that from an economic perspective, the best inter-
ests of the corporation means maximizing the value of the corporation.99 
The Supreme Court held that various factors and stakeholder groups may 
be relevant in determining what directors should consider in soundly 
managing with a view to the best interests of the corporation.100 In a sub-
sequent case, the Supreme Court held that “deference should be accorded 
to business decisions of directors taken in good faith and in the perfor-
mance of the functions they were elected to perform by the sharehold-
ers.”101 
The ability to mask the accumulation of shares creates incentives 
for investors to use equity derivatives to avoid requirements of securities 
                                                 
 95. Berle, supra note 13, at 1367. 
 96. Berle, supra note 17, at 1073. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Peoples Dep’t Store Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise [2004], 3 S.C.R. 461 ¶ 42 (Can.). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. BCE, Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders [2008], 3 S.C.R. 560 ¶ 99(Can.). 
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regulation, defeating the public policy objectives of such disclosure 
rules. Moreover, the separation of formal voting rights and economic 
interest may create negative externalities with respect to corporate deci-
sion-making, where shareholders exercise voting rights on fundamental-
change transactions and there is a need for transparency through addi-
tional disclosure. But the extent of that disclosure, the policy rationales 
of requiring disclosure, and any sanctions stemming from a failure to 
disclose require discussion of their associated public policy considera-
tions. Given the lack of transparency of the extent of equity derivatives, 
rulemaking in this respect is difficult. We do not know precisely the 
harms that may be attributable to the disconnect between legal voting 
rights and economic interest. 
Regulatory intervention may be the answer in both corporate and 
securities regulation, but the nature and scope of such intervention is un-
clear. What are the underlying policy objectives and principles that 
should be set with respect to the incentive effects of equity derivatives? 
Given Berle’s caution that with power comes responsibility, which has 
been amplified by the increasing range of powers and complexity of cor-
porate activity, how can policy help align the decisions of corporate of-
ficers with stakeholders that have the most economic interests at risk?102 
Only then it is possible to determine whether there should be prohibitions 
on the voting of shares when a particular shareholder has no economic 
interest, or limitations on voting when particular thresholds above real 
economic interest are not met. If intervention is warranted, what outcome 
should be sought and do principles of conduct meet those objectives, or 
is more detailed regulation required? Should any intervention be facilita-
tive—for example, allowing companies to change their constating docu-
ments103 to prohibit voting of shares when there is no economic interest 
at risk—or should it be more standards-based, imposing the same stand-
ards across all companies? Shareholders could decide that an effective 
practice would be to develop a capacity to monitor share lending, ensur-
ing that the borrowing parties generally meet good governance standards 
or at least do not intend to use the shares to advance interests contrary to 
those of the lending company and its shareholders. 
The equity swaps example is not an isolated one. Other forms of 
equity derivatives and a massive number of credit derivatives create 
similar agency and externality problems. Given that the underlying no-
tion of corporate governance is that those with economic interests influ-
ence decisions, the uncoupling of legal and economic interests needs to 
                                                 
 102. Berle, supra note 17, at 1050. 
 103. Depending on the Canadian jurisdiction, such documents are corporate articles or corpo-
rate memoranda. See YALDEN & CONDON, supra note 7. 
1140 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1117 
be made transparent and included in future models of director and officer 
accountability. 
Equity derivatives also represent a challenge for advocates of so-
cially responsible investing. To the extent that socially responsible in-
vesting attempts to expand the number of factors considered in the gov-
ernance of companies and the sustainability of their economic and pro-
ductive activities, it must account for the growing and nontransparent 
practice of uncoupling economic interest from shareholder voting rights. 
The wealth-maximization goals of corporate officers are, for socially 
responsible investing, overlaid with the goal of maximizing wealth in a 
manner that is socially responsible and aimed at long-term economic, 
social, and environmental sustainability. The unifying notion is that di-
rectors have a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the cor-
poration and thus maximize enterprise value through oversight of mana-
gerial activity in the effective use of corporate assets. These objectives 
may require new transparency and accountability norms to ensure that 
directors and officers do act in the best interests of the corporation 
through the use of long-term socially responsible and sustainable activi-
ties. 
The range of corporate accountability problems raised by the exist-
ence of equity derivatives echo those discussed by Berle when he sug-
gested that shareholder primacy is the solution to the unaccountability 
that would be created by a broader stakeholder-accountability structure. 
The disparate and conflicting interests of shareholders are now as com-
plex and difficult as those of stakeholders once were. Hedging through 
equity derivatives results in a potential shift of interests by some share-
holders, creating a lack of incentive to monitor managers or to act, as 
well as incentives for managers to engage in self-dealing or shirking. It 
challenges us to reconceptualize the type of interests, economic or oth-
erwise, at risk in corporate activity, to make those relationships transpar-
ent, and to shift governance and officer accountability to reflect that new 
paradigm. 
The notion that directors and officers are able to operate the corpo-
ration solely for one set of stakeholders—shareholders—is outdated. In 
widely held corporate structures, relationships have fundamentally shift-
ed since Berle wrote about shareholder primacy because of the range of 
shareholder types, the time that shareholders hold their equity interests, 
and highly varying levels of shareholdings. Derivatives are one of many 
important changes that need to be addressed in any revised conception of 
corporate accountability. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
What can be drawn from Berle’s analysis? His notion that the exer-
cise of corporate power is subject to the equitable limit of not being able 
to harm the interests of equity holders can potentially be applied to a 
broader set of stakeholders.104 The electronic and other mechanisms now 
available to communicate with stakeholders and to receive their direct 
input address some of the concerns Berle articulated back in 1931. Build-
ing on his analysis, corporate powers could be measured against the au-
thority granted to directors and officers by statutes and corporate char-
ters. They could also be scrutinized to see if corporate officers are mak-
ing decisions that are sensitive to the equities in the particular situation, 
particularly when decisions harm the economic security of those making 
a significant contribution to the corporation. Those equities might be 
subject to a proportionality assessment that weighs the potential econom-
ic benefits and the social good to be achieved, and that considers who is 
bearing the costs of corporate decisions. 
There may also be a greater role for good faith conduct on the part 
of directors and officers, which Berle observed was a short-form descrip-
tion of the need to consider the equities of particular decisions based on 
what economic interest is really at risk. There are now cognitive-
neuroscientific explanations for the relationship between directors, offic-
ers, and the multitude of stakeholders impacted by the corporation’s ac-
tivities, in addition to cultural and social norms that influence the con-
duct of directors and officers.105 These explanations include the capacity 
of corporate officers to fully understand risk, particularly the risk posed 
to others by certain decisions, and weigh current short-term wealth gen-
eration with long-term obligations of the corporation to the communities 
in which their activities are located. 
The challenge of equity derivatives allows us to think about the best 
interests of the corporation and its stakeholders and to consider account-
ability structures that reflect real interests at risk. It would allow a range 
of accountability models that reflect the differing cultural, social, and 
governance norms across and between jurisdictions. The conversation is 
just beginning. 
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